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Introduction
One of the better ways to celebrate next year’s fiftieth anniversary of Gideon
v. Wainwright,1 in which the Supreme Court held that poor defendants accused
of felonies in state court are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel,
would be to force every lawmaker, judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney
in the United States to read the last major work of a man who believed the
legacy of Gideon is not an unequivocally positive one. In The Collapse of American
Criminal Justice, the late Bill Stuntz argues that the cure for the pathologies of
the criminal justice system lies in restoring local democratic control over crime
policy, better funding public defenders, and buttressing equal protection
doctrine, rather than in the continued focus on the “vast network of procedural
rules the Supreme Court has crafted since the early 1960s” (302). Stuntz argues
that the fetishization of so many formalistic procedures that, in his view, at best
indirectly ensure fairness of trial and sentencing outcomes has rendered trials
too expensive, which in turn has driven prosecutors and lawmakers to seek
ways to avoid trial and force pleas through draconian sentencing schemes, a
skewed focus on easily detected urban drug crimes mostly committed by racial
minorities, and ever-expanding substantive criminal law. The result of this
assembly-line justice, Stuntz argues, is both excessive punitiveness in the form
of racially disparate mass incarceration and excessive leniency in the form of
underprosecuted violent crime in poor communities.
Stuntz humbly admonishes that he is neither an empiricist nor an historian,2
and it is true that many of his causal claims start with phrases like “It seems
more than a coincidence that . . . .” Moreover, other recent scholarship
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372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2.

Stuntz’s humility is legendary. As a student in his criminal procedure class, I recall him
politely but with good humor requesting on the last day that we dispense with the tradition
of clapping for one’s professors as if they were demigods, “bounding gazelle-like from the
classroom.”
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seems to call into question Stuntz’s claims about prosecutors’ focus on drug
crimes to the detriment of violent crime clearance rates,3 and the impact of
excessive sentencing on incarceration rates.4 Nevertheless, Stuntz’s origin
story and reform proposals make intuitive sense and seem to square with the
realities of modern criminal practice. In any event, the power of the book is
not as a definitive statement of cause-and-effect followed by a comprehensive
prescriptive agenda, but rather as a moral challenge to the rest of us to continue
the conversation after he is gone.
In the pages that follow, I hope to accomplish two goals. First, I briefly
describe Stuntz’s descriptive claims and proposals for reform, trying to point
out some of what makes it so powerful but also raising a few doubts and
qualifications. One of those qualifications is that Stuntz’s primary arguments
are very much anchored in a world that is gradually disappearing: a world in
which scientific evidence plays a minor role, at most, in criminal prosecutions.
My second goal, accordingly, is to examine how Stuntz’s arguments play out
in a new world in which complex scientific evidence such as DNA testing is
becoming increasingly central to criminal adjudication. That world is briefly
mentioned but little explored in Stuntz’s book, but it turns out that his
largest themes—in particular the need to focus on providing defendants with
procedural protections that are substantively meaningful in challenging this
new form of proof and that take innocence seriously—will be as important in
that world as in the one Stuntz describes.
How Did We Get Here?
Anyone who has listened to NPR recently is likely aware that America has
the highest rates of incarceration in the world, that our population of prisoners
is grossly skewed in terms of race and class, and that our imprisonment rates
have increased even as national crime rates have dropped over the last 20
years. What is less well known, if Stuntz’s claims are right, is that we are also
in a period of excessive leniency in which violent crime is underprosecuted in
poor urban communities, that our system is rigged to coerce guilty pleas with
high average sentences from both factually innocent and guilty defendants,
and that the very definition of factual guilt has expanded over the years in a
way that is profoundly antidemocratic.
Outside the insular worlds of academia and the criminal defense bar, many
find it difficult to believe that a factually innocent person would plead guilty.
3.

For example, only about 20 percent of offenders in 2006 were in prison for drug crimes.
James Forman Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21, 46–47 (2012). Meanwhile, huge racial disparities exist in violent crime
prosecution rates, id., which would suggest that violent crime in poor communities is
prosecuted quite often, assuming that violent crime is mostly intraracial.

4.

See John Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations, at 18, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990508 (Jan. 23, 2012) (determining from previously unreviewed
data that a large increase in felony filings per arrest, rather than factors such as number
of arrests or length of sentence per admission, is primarily responsible for the increase in
incarceration from 1980 to the present).
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Stuntz’s account is both comforting and disturbing in that it will hopefully
reveal to all—including non-lawyers, who will find the book fascinating and
eminently readable—why it would be absurd to assume otherwise.
Defendants often are told that if they do not accept a plea deal, they will be
charged with numerous overlapping state and/or federal offenses carrying
draconian maximum penalties, mandatory minimums, habitual offender
enhancements, or profound collateral consequences such as lifetime sex
offender registration or deportation. While the defendant has a theoretical
right to take the case to trial, his lawyer might advise him that his chances of
winning are slim, or cannot be adequately assessed by the time the plea deal
expires. Prosecutors often set plea deadlines early, sometimes even before the
preliminary hearing or indictment, rendering nearly impossible a full factual
investigation by counsel of the charges and state’s proof before advising the
client on the chances of winning at trial. These concerns are heightened for
the vast majority of defendants who are indigent; appointed counsel’s
allocation of time to factual investigation rather than other types of advocacy
is often skewed by a crushing caseload in the hundreds and, in some
jurisdictions, a fee structure that pays by the case rather than the hour.5
Even with respect to defendants who are factually guilty of some crime, harsh
sentencing schemes, overcharging, and expansive substantive law ensure that
plea deals often end in disproportionate sentences determined unilaterally by
prosecutors. Moreover, the behavior that counts as “factual guilt” has been
dramatically expanded under modern substantive criminal law. As Stuntz
points out, vaguer common-law definitions of crimes, which left significant
discretion to juries in determining what type of conduct is wrongful, have
given way to precisely defined statutory offenses that leave little room for jury
discretion.
Stuntz notes that in the Gilded Age, crime and imprisonment rates were
both very low and relatively stable (17, 133). What changed, and why? To
summarize Stuntz’s major theses in a paragraph is difficult given the epic
nature of the historical account he offers, which begins with the French
Revolution and continues through Reagan’s War on Drugs. But four key links
in the chain are that (1) Warren-Era decisions have rendered trials much more
expensive; (2) the high cost of trials, the high crime rate of the 1960s–1970s, and
the perception that courts were too protective of guilty defendants created a
perfect storm driving lawmakers and prosecutors to pursue measures intended
to make convictions cheaper and easier, such as high sentences and broader
definitions of crimes; (3) the racial disparity in incarceration is largely due
both to discrimination, which continues unabated under current ineffectual
equal protection law, and to a law enforcement focus on cheap and easy urban
drug prosecutions as a proxy for more difficult violent crime prosecutions;
and (4) the minorities most affected today by the instabilities in current crime
5.

See, e.g., National Legal Aid and Defender Association, In Defense of Public Access to Justice
(2004) at 30, available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Evaluation/la_eval.
pdf.
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and imprisonment rates lack political capital, unlike the wave of European
immigrants who became part of the political mainstream in the early 20th
century and defeated American’s previous and more transparent war on drugs,
Prohibition.
A Way Out?
While the book’s title portends a depressing story of systemic failure, the
ultimate thrust of the book is hopeful. Stuntz proposes a mix of political and
doctrinal changes that would work symbiotically to produce low violent crime
rates and humane law enforcement policies. While I question the scope and
efficacy of some of his solutions, it is difficult to argue with the central thesis of
the book that a greater focus on substantive justice and democracy will be an
important part of any successful reform effort.
On the democracy front, Stuntz suggests that we shift decision-making
over prison funding to the urban communities most affected by mass
incarceration, and decision-making over police funding to the state and
county actors who tend to be more punitive. The goal is decreased reliance on
prisons and increased reliance on policing, a change Stuntz shows is proven
to reduce crime. The shift should also, he predicts, render sentencing reform
more politically feasible. Stuntz further suggests increasing funding to public
defender offices to allow them to spend more time on factual investigation and
not focus their limited time primarily on filing boilerplate motions to enforce
procedural rights.6
Stunz also proposes enhancing juror diversity by drawing jury pools from city
rather than county demographics and eliminating peremptory strikes, arguing
that such measures would be more effective than relying on defense counsel to
litigate difficult-to-prove claims of racial bias in the selection process. Yet even
if jury pools in a highly diverse city like Oakland, California were city-based
rather than county-based, they would be disproportionately white because of
strict jury exclusion laws that disproportionately affect minority jurors. Any
attempt to increase juror diversity must also address disenfranchisement laws.7
It is tempting to be pessimistic about whether such political reforms are
remotely realistic, given the account of some scholars that those in power
6.

Of course, increased funding will not stop counsel from filing motions; so long as a procedural
right is recognized and arguably violated, they have a constitutional and professional
obligation to do so. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (deeming failure
to file a meritorious motion to suppress deficient performance for “ineffective assistance of
counsel” purposes).

7.

In Alameda County (which includes Oakland), first-time felony crack cocaine convictions
for personal possession, unlike those for powder cocaine or methamphetamine, result in
the citizen’s lifetime exclusion from jury service absent the granting of a “Certificate of
Rehabilitation,” which requires, among other things, proof of seven years of rehabilitation.
See Cal. Penal Code §§ 4852.01-03.
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cling to crime policy as a tool of social control8 or racial subjugation,9 and
the fact that sentencing reform has failed even in majority-minority cities like
Washington, D.C.10 But perhaps there is also room for optimism. New York’s
strict Rockefeller drug laws, notably passed with the support of many African
American leaders,11 were repealed in 1994, and as Stuntz discusses at length,
Prohibition failed in spite of—indeed, perhaps because of12—its potential as a
means of targeting immigrant populations.
On the doctrinal front, Stuntz first suggests a return to vaguer commonlaw language to describe various crimes, and calls for courts to “reestablish”
the concept of mens rea (303). Yet such small steps, even if politically feasible,
would have limited effect if a jurisdiction kept other expansive and commonly
invoked doctrines such as the felony murder rule, which imposes nearly strict
liability on felons for killings during the course of and in furtherance of the
felony, and so-called Pinkerton liability, which imposes nearly strict liability on all
co-conspirators for foreseeable acts of other conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy.13 Perhaps Stuntz would view these doctrines as non-pathological
because, though punitive and contrary to traditional mens rea requirements,
they might not be the product of hasty, undemocratic attempts to enable
cheap and easy prosecutions for the sake of avoiding trials.
The second, and more controversial, doctrinal reform Stuntz suggests
is to ensure just trial and sentencing outcomes through equal protection
and substantive due process doctrine rather than more indirectly through
enforcement of the procedural guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Stuntz acknowledges that “the undoing of” Warren Era
decisions is an unrealistic goal (302). Even if such an “undoing” were possible,
it surely would not increase the number of trials so long as severe sentencing
and easily proven crimes remain on the books. Prosecutors, many of whom
receive merit increases based on conviction rates,14 would still have an incentive
to encourage pleas and to avoid a possible loss at trial by overcharging or
threatening lengthy prison time. Instead, Stuntz suggests that courts shift
their focus to facilitating equal protection arguments against discriminatory
8.

See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).

9.

See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (New Press 2010).

10.

See James Forman Jr., supra note 3, at 47.

11.

See id.

12.

See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 2024 (2008) (“Politicians
and judges alike worried obsessively about the chronically inconsistent enforcement of the
Eighteenth Amendment, and about what those enforcement patterns said about the rule of
law in America.”).

13.

See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).

14.

See, e.g., Jessica Fender, DA Chambers offers bonuses for prosecutors who hit conviction
targets, Denver Post, Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_17686874.
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and coercive law enforcement tactics. Under current law, selective prosecution
claims and other fairness-based arguments are often dead losers because
defendants do not have enough data to be entitled to a hearing, but need to
have a hearing to discover the data.
To end this “legal Catch-22” (120), Stuntz suggests forcing jurisdictions
to keep data relevant to such claims. If the defendant in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes15 had access to comprehensive sentencing statistics listing the offense,
underlying facts of offense, and race of offender, he could have argued that the
prosecutor’s use of a habitual offender statute to threaten life in prison for an
$88 forged check, a strategy employed solely to force a five-year plea deal, was
illegal given that no other defendants faced a similar sentence on such facts. In
drug prosecutions, defendants could argue that their overly harsh plea deals
do not match their drug crimes and are proof of pretextual motive (301). In
the coerced confession context, “a requirement that interrogation sessions
be taped so that judges could see (or at least hear) for themselves how the
relevant actors behaved” (212) would deter abusive tactics and make it easier
to prove involuntary confessions violative of due process (all without relying
on Miranda doctrine, which according to Stuntz perversely provides legal cover
for coercive tactics and rewards only sophisticated suspects).
Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana,16 teenager Gary Duncan might have proven
that had he been white, he never would have been prosecuted in 1966 for
the two-year offense of simple battery based on an alleged “slap” of a white
youth who was harassing Duncan’s 12-year old cousins for attending a recently
desegregated school. Stuntz points out that it was the racist prosecution in
Duncan that seems most unjust, and not so much the procedural error for
which the case is most famous: the denial of a jury trial for a non-petty offense.
Indeed, the reversal on that ground is not what ultimately saved Duncan;
before his trial on remand, the legislature capped the sentence for battery at
six months, which would have made his second trial a bench trial as well.17
Two doubts might be raised, however, about Stuntz’s attack on the Warren
Court and embrace of equal protection doctrine. First, while Stuntz is surely
right, as he has argued in previous work, that “[p]rocedural regulation
inevitably encourages substantive overreaching,”18 such overreaching might
also occur in response to changes he suggests. It might first come in the form
15.

434 U.S. 357 (1978).

16.

391 U.S. 145 (1968).

17.

After remand, a federal district court enjoined the prosecution on grounds that the state’s
case was brought in “bad faith” and for the purpose of “harassment.” Duncan v. Perez, 445
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971). Stuntz laments that “no body of law arose from the [later] decision”
(369 n.72).

18.

William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 819
(2006). Interestingly, Stuntz does not point to widespread substantive overreaching in the
federal system before the 1970s, even though the Bill of Rights has been binding in federal
prosecutions since the Founding.
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of perjured testimony. After Mapp v. Ohio19 made the exclusionary rule binding
on states, the number of “dropsy” cases in which police claimed to have seen
defendants throw what looked to be drugs or weapons from their person
significantly rose.20 Similarly, if Gary Duncan’s primary remedy were to stem
from showing through data that officials would not have brought the case on
such facts had he been white, officials might be tempted to embellish the facts
beyond a mere slap. In the confession context, police might be tempted to
coerce confessions before taping begins, then have suspects repeat their words
on tape.21 Overreaching could also come in the form of “leveling up.” In a case
like Bordenkircher, under a more robust equal protection regime, officials might
be tempted to start charging more defendants under the habitual offender
law to foreclose claims that such prosecutions are unusual. And in drug cases,
officials might pursue higher drug sentences across the board to rebut a charge
that a high sentence suggests that the prosecution is a pretextual substitute for
a more difficult violent crime prosecution.
Second, recognizing (as Stuntz does) that certain basic procedural rights
such as the right to jury, counsel, and protection against coerced confessions
are likely necessary to preclude wrongful convictions (81), it is not clear why
the Warren Court was wrong to interpret them as binding on the States. While
an all-white jury in Louisiana’s notorious Plaquemines Parish in 1966 may well
have convicted Duncan anyway, a fairly selected jury might have acquitted,
or at least would have been more likely to acquit than a judge beholden to
segregationist officials. The legislature’s desperation to reduce the maximum
sentence immediately before Duncan’s remand suggests as much. But that
premise seems to suggest that Duncan was not necessarily wrongly decided,
other than its overly narrow grounds. While reasonable people might disagree
about the legitimacy of incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause,22 that broader debate is not one that Stuntz directly invokes.
Ensuring Substantive Justice in an Era of Science-Based Prosecutions
Stuntz briefly gives a nod to the coming era of science-based prosecutions,
describing “the increasing range and accuracy of forensic evidence, including
DNA” as “the greatest advance in criminal procedure of the past generation”
(227). To be sure, DNA testing promises to dramatically enhance both
systemic accuracy and crime clearance rates, although its potential to do the
latter is hampered by testing backlogs and the perverse policy of many state
19.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

20.

See, e.g., Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan
Police Practices 1960–62, 4 Crim. L. Bull. 549, 549–50 (1968) (noting that “dropsy” testimony
was much more prevalent after Mapp).

21.

While a “question-first, warn-later” strategy might be illegal under Miranda, see Missouri
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring), judges might view the second
confession—assuming they knew about it—voluntary under a “totality of circumstances” due
process test.

22.

See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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laboratories to prioritize testing based on when a case is up for trial, rather
than the seriousness of the offense.23 But a reported DNA match may still
be unreliable evidence of guilt in any given case, based on interpretive error,
contamination, faulty statistics, or reasons for innocent presence such as DNA
“transfer.”24 At the same time, DNA’s perceived infallibility and complexity
make it more difficult to uncover such errors through investigation and trial
challenges. Unlike eyewitnesses, for example, DNA results do not break
down under cross-examination, and jurors have trouble assessing the results’
probative value, which is typically a function of complex statistical analysis.
Meanwhile, lesser forensic methods of dubious reliability are still admitted
against defendants. A scathing 2009 report by the National Academy of
Sciences concluded that several routinely used forensic methods, including
latent fingerprint analysis, are lacking in basic validation as a tool for reliably
identifying suspects.25 The report noted that most methods other than DNA
testing were developed solely for law enforcement purposes, and have not been
meaningfully scrutinized by the broader scientific community.26 The report
suggested that courts have too leniently admitted such methods under the
so-called “Frye” test,27 which asks not whether the science is actually reliable,
but simply whether there is “consensus” in the relevant scientific community
about its reliability. Not surprisingly, the Innocence Project reports that faulty
forensic methods contributed to wrongful convictions in over 50 percent of
reported DNA exonerations.28
While Stuntz mentions scientific evidence only in passing, his call for a
greater focus not on specific, formalized procedures for their own sake but
on meaningful procedures that ensure substantive justice is equally as critical
in an era of DNA as it was for Gary Duncan in 1960’s Louisiana. Take first
the fact that courts are still admitting unvalidated forensic methods, and the
23.

Thus, perversely, DNA testing in many jurisdictions is used more for confirmation of an
existing suspect in drug and property crimes rather than to investigate unsolved rapes
and homicides. See Andrea L. Roth, Database-Driven Investigations: The Promise—and
Peril—of Using Forensics To Solve “No-Suspect” Cases, 9 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 421,
421–22 (2010) (citing Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman, Unanalyzed Evidence in
Law Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing in Policing
Departments, 9 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 381 (2010)).

24.

See, e.g., Erin E. Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson’s Guide to the
Subjectivity Inherent in DNA Typing, 58 Emory L.J. 489 (2008); William C. Thompson,
Tarnish on the ‘Gold Standard’: Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing,
The Champion (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://www.newkirkcenter.uci.edu/Thompson/
Tarnish.pdf.

25.

See National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academy Press 2009).

26.

Id. at 183–84.

27.

See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

28.

See http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php.
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Frye test—still followed in a significant number of states29—is not an effective
filter. Heeding Stuntz’s call to interpret the Due Process Clause in a way that
focuses on outcome accuracy and protecting innocent defendants, one solution
might be to recognize a basic due process right not to be convicted based on
unreliable scientific evidence, i.e., to “constitutionalize” the reliability-based
admissibility standard for expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrill-Dow
Pharmaceuticals.30
On the other hand, when it comes to DNA testing, a method in which the
science is generally well-validated but where case-specific errors are possible
and difficult to detect, protection against “unreliable” pseudo-science is not
sufficient. What an innocent defendant needs to meaningfully challenge faulty
DNA testing and other seemingly hyper-reliable but still fallible “secondgeneration” forensic methods31 is an attorney who understands enough about
the potential errors to consult an expert; money to hire experts; money and
access to biological material to facilitate possible testing or retesting; access to
the government’s procedures, analysts, and statistical databases to be able to
assess the accuracy of the testing results and match statistics;32 and a factfinder
who will understand the probative value (or lack thereof) of the test results
and the defense’s attacks on those results.
Here, Stuntz’s wariness of “freezing [specific] procedures in place” (79) at
the expense of more directly protecting the substantive rights ostensibly served
by those frozen procedures is validated yet again. With respect to confrontation,
Stuntz notes that current law contemplates live testimony rather than scientific
evidence. He specifically targets Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,33 in which the
Court held that the state, upon a defendant’s request, must introduce drug
analysis reports through the live testimony of the chemists who authored the
reports, rather than simply admitting such reports under a hearsay exception.
The decision was a follow-up to Crawford v. Washington,34 in which the Court
held that confrontation is a categorical procedural right applicable to all
“testimonial” hearsay, rather than a more flexible right to confront evidence
29.

At least 13 states still follow Frye, and another four have a hybrid standard that does not fully
embrace the reliability-based test of Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(1993). See Kenneth W. Waterway & Robert C. Weill, A Plea for Legislative Reform: The
Adoption of Daubert To Ensure the Reliability of Expert Evidence in Florida Courts, 36
Nova L. Rev. 1, 25 (2011).

30.

See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 353, 360 (2003) (calling for
constitutionalization of Daubert in death penalty sentencings).

31.

See Erin E. Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 721 (2007).

32.

The FBI currently refuses, for example, to allow researchers access to anonymized profiles in
the national DNA database to test the accuracy of the FBI’s purported match statistics. See
Dan Krane et al., Time for DNA Disclosure, 326 Science 1631–32 (2009).

33.

557 U.S. 305 (2009).

34.

541 U.S 36 (2004).
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deemed potentially untrustworthy. Stuntz argues that Melendez-Diaz actually
“undermines” the advance of science (227): if chemists are spending their
time testifying for the sake of a likely uneventful cross-examination rather
than conducting analyses that would solve cases, innocent suspects and crime
victims ultimately suffer.
While there are reasons to believe this particular concern is unfounded,35
Stuntz’s broader point is well taken that courts’ exclusive focus on crossexamination has obscured the rationale underlying the right of confrontation.
But the answer need not be to view the right as trivial in the modern age, or
to return to the pre-Crawford standard that treated the existence of the right as
turning on the perceived trustworthiness of the evidence. Indeed, it is the very
fact that DNA testing results are assumed to be so trustworthy, but may well
not be, that make them resistant to challenge except through investigation by
a zealous advocate for the defense. Rather, the answer should be for courts to
recognize that the right of confrontation is not historically or logically limited
to cross-examination and physical confrontation, but—as David Sklansky
has suggested—encompasses “the broader ability of an accused to test and to
challenge the state’s proof.”36 Correctly viewed as such, the confrontation right
would entitle a defendant to the type of access to government-controlled data
and material needed to meaningfully investigate DNA testing results.
In the same respect, the right to jury—if interpreted merely as a right to
a venire of impartial citizens from a fair cross-section of the population—
may be cold comfort for a defendant whose rebuttal of the state’s proffered
forensic evidence requires some level of scientific competence on the part of
the factfinder to understand or credit. Scott Brewer has written of a possible
“intellectual due process” norm—that is, a requirement that “factfinding
regarding matters that are the special epistemic province of expert scientists,
must be conducted in a coherent and rational manner.”37 Perhaps the Due
Process Clause should be interpreted to allow a criminal defendant to insist
upon a scientifically trained factfinder or trial by judge rather than jury38 where
necessary to ensure a nonarbitrary verdict.
35.

For example, California and Illinois required live testimony from chemists long before
the Court required it, and the cost of drug trials did not skyrocket. Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Reply Brief for Petitioner Luis E. Melendez-Diaz 27-28,
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_
preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_07_591_PetitionerReply.authcheckdam.pdf. One reason is
that defendants often waive the right; after all, the government’s case generally becomes
more persuasive when the jury hears from a live scientist rather than a hearsay report.

36.

David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 67, 71–72 (2009).

37.

See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L.J.
1535, 1676 (1998).

38.

The Supreme Court has thus far upheld as constitutional the requirement that defendants
secure permission from the government before insisting upon a bench trial. Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
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Finally, the right to counsel—if interpreted merely as a right to an appointed
attorney—means little without low enough caseloads and appropriate fee
structures to facilitate spending time on forensic investigation, as well as
adequate funding to allow meaningful training, hiring of experts without
undue resistance from judges protecting tight court budgets, and testing or
retesting of forensic material as needed. Stuntz suggests that courts, rather than
setting specific “budget lines” (299), provide incentives for state legislatures to
create their own funding solutions. This suggestion seems reasonable, so long
as legislatures take into account the particular pressures on indigent defense
counsel created by the influx of complex scientific evidence in criminal trials.
In the end, Stuntz’s call for more substantive justice, democracy, and mercy
is well reasoned, well timed, and, one hopes, will be well received by those
with the power to enact change. In his essay “Law and Grace” written shortly
before he died, Stuntz writes that we, like Dr. Martin Luther King, should
“fight for the chance to embrace” our enemies.39 The lessons of The Collapse of
American Criminal Justice—in teaching that we all have more in common than we
imagine, are all guiltier than we imagine for the injustice that surrounds us,
and are all capable of doing better—give us little moral excuse to do otherwise.
As Stuntz would say, “both sides are us” (312).

39.

William J. Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 Va. L. Rev. 367, 384 (2012).

